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Abstract 
In a recent decision, the European Court of Justice has ruled that insurers cannot discriminate 
on grounds of sex in setting premiums or determining benefits. This paper discusses the 
background to this decision. It asks whether we are seeing a US-style ‘rights revolution’, 
fuelled by judicial activism, as suggested by Dobbin et al’s hypothesis of ‘the strength of weak 
states’ or Kagan and Kelemen’s account of ‘adversarial legalism’. It is shown that neither of 
these theories captures the distinctive nature of the ECJ’s intervention. An industry-friendly 
policy was pursued in regulatory venues, but this was overridden by the ECJ’s interpretation 
of the fundamental right of equal treatment. However, it is also shown that the judicial 
defence of fundamental rights is a weak basis for social policy, and does not foreshadow a 
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A Rights Revolution in Europe? 
Regulatory and judicial approaches 
to nondiscrimination in insurance  
 
1. The Regulatory and Judicial Politics of Nondiscrimination 
Rights 
Does the EU’s expanding lexicon of equality and nondiscrimination rights provide 
the basis for a ‘rights revolution’ in Europe? The pioneering measures taken against 
sex discrimination in employment have now been extended to other grounds: race, 
age, disability, religion and sexual orientation. The prohibition on race and sex 
discrimination extends beyond employment, to include markets for goods and 
services. The scope of these grounds has thus come to resemble the prohibition on 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, one of the foundational principles of 
economic integration in Europe. Could the expanded equality rights provide a 
platform for a European-level social union, complementing the economic union?  
In a sense, Europe has already had its own rights revolution, because the processes of 
market integration have been driven by rights claims, albeit often by businesses 
seeking to exercise economic freedoms. But the idea of a rights revolution advanced 
by American commentators drew attention to the extension of rights beyond 
property and contract, to encompass social and political rights such as due process in 
administrative procedure, freedom of speech and religion, and prohibitions on 
discrimination based on personal characteristics such as race and sex (Epp 1998, p.7). 
The formulation and exercise of these rights saw new patterns of political 
mobilisation, and engaged the courts in extended processes of mediating claims 





coming from households as consumers and workers seeking to exercise rights 
against big business or the state. 
In Europe, nondiscrimination has a double face, as a social right and as a market-
conforming principle. Nondiscrimination has been advanced as a distinct mode of 
social regulation, particularly in employment. At the same time, it serves the process 
of economic integration, for example when consumers seek rights to transact across 
borders or workers seek employment in other countries. Within the European 
Commission, different directorates tend towards different orientations. 
Nondiscrimination directives are proposed and shepherded by the Employment and 
Justice directorates, where they are framed as ‘social’ and ‘citizenship’ rights. But the 
Competition and Internal Market directorates largely accept the rights agenda, 
because it is normally broadly compatible with market integration. This makes the 
nondiscrimination frame particularly attractive to the Commission. However, it does 
not tell us whether nondiscrimination rights in Europe are the basis of distinct social 
regulatory processes or are a mere handmaiden of competitive market integration.  
The discussion in this paper focuses on the regulation of discrimination in insurance, 
because insurance is a critical case for examining this question. Openness to 
competition can be expected to intensify problems of discrimination in insurance. If 
nondiscrimination rights are a handmaiden to the market, we would expect to find 
the EU institutions developing interpretations of discrimination that endorse those 
industry practices likely to facilitate market integration. Conversely, if social policy 
objectives rather than industry preferences shape policy, distinct social regulatory 
principles could be allowed to stand in the way of market integration. 
The application of nondiscrimination rights to insurance became a highly salient 
issue with the proposal for a directive1 prohibiting sex discrimination in the 
provision of goods and services (the ‘Gender Directive’). Article 4 of the proposal 
provided that the use of sex as a factor in the calculation of insurance premiums 
would be prohibited. It set out a timescale for implementation which allowed 
                                                        
1 Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between women 
and men in the access to and supply of goods and services, COM(2003) 657 final  
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member states a six-year postponement, provided they would ‘compile, publish and 
regularly update comprehensive tables on the mortality and life expectancy of 
women and men’.  In Art 5(2) of the final directive, agreed by the Council in 20042, 
member states were allowed to maintain differential factors indefinitely, although 
they would have to produce relevant data on the use of sex as a determining 
actuarial factor. They were also obliged to review their decision in 2012, aided by a 
report to be produced by the Commission. 
This compromise could be interpreted as an illustration of regulatory negotiation 
and problem-solving. The following discussion shows that the industry dominated 
the regulatory process. The principle of nondiscrimination contained sufficient 
ambiguity to be accommodated to existing market practices, with some adjustments. 
However, this is not the end of the story, because nondiscrimination rights are also 
subject to judicial interpretation. The ECJ approached the application of 
nondiscrimination to insurance in a different way to the regulatory policy 
community. Thus the impact of nondiscrimination rights turned out to hinge on the 
relationship between regulatory and judicial policy-making. To put it bluntly, it 
appears that nondiscrimination rights are the handmaiden of competitive market 
processes when they are developed and implemented by industry-dominated 
regulatory policy communities, but they acquire more autonomy when they are 
interpreted and applied by the ECJ. 
Literature inspired by American commentaries on the ‘rights revolution’ gives us (at 
least) two different perspectives on this situation. One interpretation is that the rights 
revolution reveals ‘the strength of weak states’ (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Lieberman 
2002). In short, the ‘weak state’ produces vague and ambiguous laws and does not 
invest executive agencies with the power to provide authoritative interpretations of 
their application. Paradoxically, such laws may turn out to have a strong impact, as 
activists search out channels for using the law and incumbent economic actors seek 
to reduce the uncertainty the law creates. The wholesale characterisation of the US as 
                                                        
2 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004, implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. 





a ‘weak state’ has been justly criticised, but the kernel of the argument may be 
preserved as an account of the potential strength of vague laws in a state with weak 
social policy-making capacity. The EU’s recent nondiscrimination laws are such laws: 
vagueness and ambiguity have been essential to their passage through the EU’s 
decision-making processes (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004). Despite the attempts of 
member states and the Commission to produce definitive interpretations of the 
Directive in the course of transposition, the availability of recourse to the ECJ has 
meant that regulators have not been able to control the interpretation and 
dissemination of an ambiguous measure.  
Other commentators are much less inclined to find strength in executive weakness. A 
leading critique is Kagan’s (2001) theory of ‘adversarial legalism’, where 
opportunities for efficient regulatory negotiation are impeded by recourse to the 
courts. Kelemen (2004, 2011) has suggested that the EU is vulnerable to adversarial 
legalism, albeit in a particular form that he terms ‘Eurolegalism’. Whereas American 
adversarial legalism is driven by the organisation of interests to make claims, 
facilitated by opportunities for class actions and the potential for vast damages, 
Eurolegalism is more strongly marked by the effects of competition for authority 
between levels of government in Europe. This competition produces legalism, in the 
form of lengthy and detailed regulations. It also produces court cases, insofar as the 
relative weakness of the Commission encourages it to turn to the ECJ. The 
Commission uses compliance actions before the ECJ to limit the discretion of national 
governments. Thus ‘[t]he fragmentation of power at the federal level encourages an 
adversarial, litigious approach to regulation that reduces the discretion of states in 
implementing federal statutes.’ (Kelemen 2004, p.2)  
Both these theories, in their different ways, posit that regulatory and judicial 
processes are closely linked. Dobbin (2009) emphasises that there are two-way 
processes of communication between self-regulatory practices and judicial norms. 
Corporations anticipate judicial rulings and take advance steps to comply; courts 
look at corporate ‘best practice’ in deciding what norms to set. Kelemen proposes 
that the Commission uses the ECJ to make up for its own lack of power, the 
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suggestion being that the two institutions pursue common goals. By contrast, this 
paper highlights the apparent autonomy of the ECJ. The Commission endeavoured 
to avoid a legalistic approach to the implementation of the Gender Directive, 
establishing a regulatory network and promoting a compromise between industry 
and consumer interests that was permissive of existing discriminatory practices. The 
ECJ, however, has taken on the development and application of nondiscrimination 
law in a way that pays little heed to the Commission and the industry. 
The argument advanced here is that it is necessary to pay attention to the nature of 
nondiscrimination rights as fundamental rights to understand the way that they have 
developed in the EU. Nondiscrimination is therefore distinct from other rights which 
are legally enforceable but not fundamental, such as the right to compensation for air 
travel delays (to take an example discussed in Kelemen 2011, pp.1-4). The ECJ’s 
insistence on the fundamentalism of certain rights has seen it acting autonomously to 
interpret and develop these rights. The consequence is that rights are not a mere 
handmaiden to market integration. However, it is also argued here that, viewed as a 
form of social regulation, fundamental rights have distinct limitations. In short, they 
are not instrumental in achieving social policy goals, and may indeed achieve very 
little at all.  
 
2. Discrimination in European insurance markets 
Buyers of insurance, like workers seeking employment but unlike consumers in most 
markets, do not enjoy anonymity in the relationship they enter into. On the contrary, 
they are required to disclose information about themselves that insurers can use to 
assess and classify the risk they present. Risk assessment entails discrimination, in 
the sense of drawing distinctions between one buyer and another. This 
discrimination may be justified: industry representatives are often supported by 
economists in insisting that it is. This section provides a brief introduction to 
insurance economics to explain why economic theory does not provide definite 
answers to the question of how much discrimination there should be. As Advocate 





General Kokott put it in her recent Test-Achats opinion, risk classification involves 
‘political, economic and social choices’3. After reviewing the economic arguments, 
this section shows how discrimination issues were (or were not) perceived and 
addressed during the ‘1992’ process of creating a single market in insurance. Some 
advocates of insurance market integration in Europe argued that more competition 
would lead to more discrimination, and that this would be efficient. In practice, 
however, this process was largely suppressed. 
To begin with insights from economics into conditions for efficiency in insurance 
markets. A standard criterion for efficiency in insurance markets is ‘actuarial 
fairness’. This criterion states that those insured should get out, on average, what 
they pay in, less some reasonable level of administration costs. If payouts are less 
than is actuarially fair, insurers will be making excess profits. However, this 
efficiency-oriented concept of actuarial fairness is silent about the size of the risk pool 
that should be used to calculate the average rate of claims. There is no economic 
principle that says that small pools are fairer than large pools. Within any pool, there 
will always be some who ‘win’ in the end, and others who receive less than they paid 
in.4 Thus, both unisex insurance and sex-differentiated insurance (for example) can 
be actuarially fair in the sense of ensuring that there are no excess profits, although in 
public debate the concept of actuarial fairness is often invoked to suggest that all 
available information should be used to differentiate risk pools. 
Another economic concept relevant to efficiency in insurance markets is market 
completeness. An efficient market economy offers participants opportunities not 
only to enter ‘spot’ or current exchanges but also to make future, state-contingent 
contracts. A complete set of such contracts would allow people to insure themselves 
against both financial risk and ‘classification risk’ (Crocker and Snow 2000, pp.249, 
273), which refers to the possibility of finding oneself classified as high risk. Clearly, 
there is less classification risk in large insurance pools than in insurance markets 
                                                        
3 Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil 
des ministres, Opinion of A-G Kokott delivered on 30 September 2010, para 47. 
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where participants are separated by risk characteristics. It follows that pooled 
insurance is more efficient on the market completeness dimension, because separated 
insurance leaves people to bear classification risk. 
However, this efficiency result is turned on its head once the possibility of adverse 
selection is considered. Adverse selection may arise when those seeking insurance 
know their own riskiness or probability of claiming. Some low-risk individuals may 
then choose not to take up the pooled contract. Their refusal to participate in pooling 
means that more insurance contracts may be concluded if classification is allowed, 
depending on whether an efficient classifier (one that correctly distinguishes low and 
high risk groups) can be found. While there is an efficiency loss from exposing 
people to classification risk, this is countered by the gain from insuring low risk 
groups who would otherwise not take out insurance.  
Along with moral hazard, adverse selection is the major market failure affecting 
insurance. One remedy for adverse selection is to make insurance compulsory, but 
competitive markets may find an alternative remedy. One way that insurers compete 
is by identifying groups with low risk characteristics that can be separated from the 
rest of the insurance pool by offering them more favourable terms. These groups 
may be identified in many ways: by consumption choices, occupation, place of 
residence, age, sex and so on. Making markets more competitive should therefore 
reduce adverse selection, by promoting the use of information to differentiate risks.  
From this perspective, far from discrimination being a sign of market failure, it is a 
solution to market failure in insurance. Furthermore, if regulators endeavour to limit 
discrimination by insurers, the problem of adverse selection will reappear, 
producing ‘regulatory adverse selection’ (Hoy 2006).  Advocates of insurance market 
liberalisation in Europe have argued that competition produces a more efficient 
insurance market. Competition leads to insurance premiums being more finely 
differentiated with respect to the probability of claiming. Finer classification of risk 





‘allows premiums to be set at a level which is more commensurate to real risk’ (van 
der Ende et al. 2006, p.8), which is a sign of a market efficiently using information.5  
These ideas might suggest that the liberalisation of the European insurance market 
would bring profound changes in risk rating practices and heightened controversy 
over the issue of discrimination. Contemporary commentators did draw attention to 
the discrimination issue (Wils 1994), but in practice it did not figure much in 
responses to the Third Life and Non-Life Insurance Directives (both passed in 1992).  
There were several reasons for this. First, discrimination on grounds of sex (as well 
as age, disability and other ‘discrimination grounds’) was permitted in most 
countries before market liberalisation got underway. Rating tables produced by 
regulators or insurance associations differentiated premiums according to long-
established criteria. These were characterised more by their conformity to the 
assumptions and preferences of the parties represented in the regulatory process 
than by adherence to principles of nondiscrimination. Assessing the changes to the 
Germany regulatory regime wrought by the single market, Rees and Kessler (1999, 
p.383) acknowledged that there were ‘equity grounds’ for arguing that ‘risk 
categorization should be less finely differentiated than might be the case if left to the 
market, so that higher and lower risks are pooled and socially desirable cross-
subsidization takes place.’ However, they were critical of the obscure principles of 
regulation that Germany applied; they thought such rules should be ‘clear, explicit 
and [..] publicly debated’. Everson (1996) advanced a similar assessment, suggesting 
that existing competition-suppressing regulatory regimes could not defend 
themselves effectively on nondiscrimination grounds, as their practices owed more 
to corporatist interest accommodation than to a coherent theory, whether based on 
welfare economics or rights. 
A second, related, factor was that insurers proceeded rather cautiously in 
introducing new bases for risk rating once the Directives came into force. Each 
                                                        
5 The literature on the economics of insurance suggests that competitive pressures will not 
necessarily produce the level of risk differentiation that most efficiently combats adverse 
selection. This is not the place to review these arguments, except to note that insurers may have 
an incentive to collude to prevent excessive differentiation of risks (Wilson 1977).  
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market demonstrated considerable inertia in practices, which can be explained by 
insurers’ uncertainty about the impact of new factors and their reliance on historical 
rating information. Indeed, having promulgated insurance directives to promote 
competition, the Commission immediately granted the industry a Block Exemption 
Regulation (BER), permitting the pooling and sharing of data between insurers. 
‘Agreements on joint calculations, tables and studies for the purpose of assessing 
risk’ are allowed. This exemption permitted the continuance of the widespread 
practice in EU member states of insurers sharing data to produce estimates of claims 
probabilities which are statistically more robust than those generated by a single 
insurer. 
In other words, while incentives to use information to identify different risk groups 
are heightened by market competition, the production of that information is a non-
competitive, or pre-competitive process. We see here the force of Prosser’s (2006) 
critique of the market failure theory of regulation as presupposing that the market 
can potentially exist without regulation. Insurance services are constituted by the 
availability of data to enable risks to be calculated, and the sharing of data for that 
purpose has been seen as necessary to establish the market and allow it to thrive. 
Indeed, the BER on pooled industry data is defended with the argument that it 
facilitates the entry of competitors into the market by giving them access to 
information which enables them to price risks. 
Choices about what data to collect and pool have been made through time without 
much engagement of public policy actors. The main source of data is claims history, 
so insurers are most confident in pricing products according to the information they 
have used in the past. An innovative insurer could use other data, available for 
example from public statistical agencies, but this is subject to ‘basis risk’ (the risk that 
the insurer’s customer base does not match the population sample used in public 
data). The result is that there is a considerable amount of convention and inertia in 
risk classification practices. 
This is not to imply that there was no innovation in risk rating practices as a result of 
the creation of the single market, although other changes in the industry - notably a 





tendency towards concentration – have been more pronounced and more closely 
studied (see eg Fenn et al. 2008). Changes in risk rating in German motor insurance 
were examined by Schwarz and Wein (2005). They found that the regulatory changes 
initiated by the European directives had produced an increase in the range of risk-
rating characteristics used, and a shift towards rating on driver characteristics such 
as age and sex, whereas the previous ratings had relied on non-driver characteristics 
such as vehicle type. They found strikingly different patterns of diffusion for 
different characteristics, with some classifications being introduced and then 
withdrawn, some used only as a ‘niche’ strategy by a few insurers, and others 
exhibiting delayed implementation. Sex fell into the latter category, with about 40% 
of insurers giving discounts to single women by 2003. More generally, they identified 
several puzzles in the diffusion pattern, with some apparently effective 
discriminators being shunned by insurers. 
Motor insurance was a controversial case, even among insurance economists. 
Because third party insurance is mandatory, efficiency gains from risk classification 
to counter adverse selection are lacking. However, classifications to counter moral 
hazard by rewarding careful driving may be efficient. At the same time, classification 
has redistributive effects which may be politically salient, for example if insurance 
becomes prohibitively expensive for young drivers. Furthermore, insurers may use 
classifications for strategic marketing purposes (charging higher premiums to those 
with the least elastic demand), rather than reflecting differences in risk. These issues 
were debated in some EU countries following the implementation of the third 
generation of insurance directives. In particular, some countries had regulatory 
regimes for ‘bonus-malus’ systems in which motor insurers were required by law to 
follow a common scheme for adjusting premiums when insureds were involved in 
accidents (Lemaire 1995). The Commission indicated that it regarded these schemes 
as anticompetitive. In Belgium, the statutory scheme was phased out at the 
beginning of 2004, amid considerable controversy. The consumer organisation Test-
Achats became involved, arguing that the arrangements that insurers had put in 
place for identifying ‘aggravated risks’ were flawed and unfair (BEUC 2002: 3-4). 
Premium loadings for young drivers became very heavy, causing political 
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intervention to persuade insurers to lower rates for this group (CEA 2007: 53-4). 
However, such examples of politicisation were rare. Consumer associations did not 
often get involved in debates over risk classification, perhaps believing that the 
creation or elimination of cross-subsidisation was a zero-sum game for their 
members. 
Genetic discrimination was another area where there was public debate about 
insurers’ practices, which came to the fore in the early 2000s. Members of the 
European Parliament pushed for EU-wide regulation, and some states legislated 
against the use of genetic information (Mattheissen-Guyader 2005). However, 
insurers in several countries, including Germany and the UK, reached voluntary 
agreements limiting the use of genetic data, indicating that in some countries the 
sector had the capacity to self-regulate in order to avoid the politicisation of risk 
classification. 
Two other factors can be mentioned as restraining innovation in risk classification 
and helping to suppress the potential conflict between promoting competition and 
restraining discrimination. At the time of the third generation directives, the 
determination of risk classifications remained connected with solvency regulation in 
a number of countries. Price control was a traditional method used by national 
authorities to ensure solvency. The price control approach had been developed on 
the theory that insurance markets were vulnerable to ruinous competition, whereby 
competitive reduction of premiums would eventually lead to firms being unable to 
honour their commitments. In the 1980s and 1990s, this approach to solvency was 
replaced by one based on assessing risks and determining adequate reserves. 
Regulatory guidance could still be given on how risks should be classified for 
solvency purposes (including the specification of relevant risk categories), but these 
risk categories did not have to be used for pricing products or determining ‘customer 
facing’ risk classes. Thus the regulation of solvency could be detached from the 





regulation of discrimination. This process was completed with the implementation of 
‘Solvency II’ in the consolidating insurance directive passed in 2009.6 
Finally, the insurance directives contained significant exemptions that permitted 
member states to continue to regulate discrimination by insurers. First and foremost, 
they excluded ‘insurance forming part of a statutory system of social security’. 
Furthermore, Article 54 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive provided that 
contracts covering health risks which served ‘as a partial or complete alternative to 
health cover provided by the statutory social security system’ could be subject to 
regulation by the host member state to protect the ‘general good’. Examples of 
regulations permitted by this measure have included requirements imposed on private 
providers to maintain open enrolment with ‘community rating’, which means that there 
is no differentiation between customers according to risk characteristics (Thomson and 
Mossialos 2007). A further development restraining risk classification came with the 
judgment in Albany and the associated cases in 1999 (Mabbett 2000), where the ECJ 
effectively exempted from competition law certain occupational pension 
arrangements, by upholding anti-competitive provisions of collective agreements 
between unions and employers on the grounds that these were needed to maintain 
insurance pools and prevent excessive selection of risks. 
In summary, the Commission promoted market integration through competition in 
insurance as in other industries. While this produced some pressures for increased 
discrimination, this was restrained in areas where it could have produced political 
contention. The element of self-restraint by insurers suggests that the constitutive 
regulation of insurance markets, through which risks are defined and calculated, 
contract terms developed, and policy-holders’ expectations shaped, is not governed 
by norms of unbridled free competition. Instead, insurance associations are active in 
finding acceptable practices. In the single market regime, a block exemption from 
competition rules facilitates industry coordination of practices and standards. The 
effect of market liberalisation (specifically, the third generation of directives) was to 
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limit the powers of national regulatory authorities, but the block exemption 
continued to allow cooperation and coordination through industry associations. 
Thus market-constitutive regulation was made more ‘decentred’ in Europe as the 
single market project proceeded. In place of ‘command and control’ regulation by 
public authorities, standard-setting and information-sharing occurred within the 
industry.  
 
3. Discrimination in insurance as an issue for social policy 
and fundamental rights 
This section examines the arguments that the Commission put forward for insurance 
regulation in its proposal for a Gender Goods and Services Directive, looking in 
particular on the Commission’s efforts to instrumentalize the principle of 
nondiscrimination for social policy purposes. The focus of social policy concern was 
pensions, or more specifically annuities. Annuities insure their holders against the 
risk of living a long life. If sex discrimination is allowed, women find that a given 
pension fund purchases a lower annuity than a man would obtain, because of their 
longer life expectancy. 
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Commission’s proposal for the 
Gender Directive drew attention to the trend in member states towards the 
privatisation of social insurance, particularly pensions. The Commission argued that 
privatisation had the potential to magnify the disadvantages faced by women in the 
labour market. A key issue was the rise in funded, ‘defined contribution’ (DC) 
pensions, where a pension fund is invested during working life and then used to 
purchase an annuity on retirement. Employers are required under existing equal pay 
law to make the same contributions to funds for women as for men, but this will 
produce lower pensions (annuities) for women. The Commission noted that, while 
equal treatment was established in statutory social insurance, ‘the move towards 





private provision is undermining this principle’(CEC 2003, p.8). One concrete way to 
counter this trend was to end the use of actuarial factors related to sex.  
However, the use of a fundamental rights competence to pursue a social policy goal 
encountered an immediate problem. The fundamental right necessarily extended to 
all insurance, whereas the social policy goal pertained specifically to pensions. 
Arguments that were convincing in the pensions context lost force when applied 
across the board. For example, motor insurance had to be included as well as 
pensions, meaning that women could lose as well as win from a unisex reform. The 
British Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) undertook a cost-benefit analysis of 
unisex tariffs, in effect rejecting the principled application of rights in favour of an 
instrumental approach. It found that elimination of gender factors ‘would bring a 
complicated mixture of gains and losses to both sexes’. Even the effect on women of 
unisex annuities was mixed, as many women depended on the annuity of a male 
partner (EOC 2004). As a result, the EOC refrained from taking a stand against the 
use of sex as a factor in insurance. The wide scope of the measure was, therefore, an 
obstacle to instrumentalizing nondiscrimination to achieve social policy goals. 
A similar point is made by Leisering and Vitic (2009), who analyse the political 
debate surrounding the adoption of unisex tariff amendment to the Riester pension 
scheme in Germany. They suggest that the measure succeeded because social policy, 
rather than legal and rights-based arguments, were relied on by the German 
campaigners. Riester pensions were closely connected to the statutory pension 
system, and were therefore subject to social policy norms. Close proximity and 
substitutability between private and social insurance meant that the private scheme 
was affected by political pressures and policy processes which were similar to those 
found in cognate areas of social policy. 
The Commission could have tried to address the pensions problem specifically, for 
example by promoting a measure for pensions analogous to Article 54 on health 
insurance (see above), allowing member states to regulate private pensions that were 
substitutive for statutory social insurance. But this was not attractive to either the 
Competition and Internal Market Directorates of the Commission or to DG 
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Employment. For the former, such a provision would be tantamount to accepting 
that market integration in pensions would not proceed, and that areas of private 
insurance related to social insurance would remain a member state competence. For 
the latter, such an approach would give up the Commission’s opportunity to 
strengthen its contribution to social policy by shaping the rules governing private 
provision. The institutional interests of both the ‘social’ and ‘market’ wings of the 
Commission pointed towards finding a way to regulate private pensions at the 
European level. 
Thus a fundamental rights approach was attractive. But this approach also pulled the 
Commission away from social policy and into a more legalistic discussion. For some 
lawyers,  it was evident that ‘sex-based actuarial factors run directly contrary to the 
essence of anti-discrimination laws which require that workers be regarded on the 
basis of their individual characteristics and not on the basis of gender stereotypes’ 
(Barnard 2006: 531). For others, sex-based factors might sometimes be justifiable. In 
German law, differential treatment of men and women can be based on ‘biological’ 
determining factors, while discrimination arising from ‘social’ factors is prohibited 
(Kopischke 2006: 79-80). This distinction produced a debate about whether women’s 
longer life expectancy was due to social factors around lifestyle, working patterns 
and nutrition, or due to biological differences between the sexes. The argument was 
that if the difference was really biological or genetic, then sex really was the relevant 
determinant and not just a proxy for other factors, so its use could be justified. 
However, others rejected this logic of justification. The Committee on Women’s 
Rights in the European Parliament argued that ‘the use of the “gender” factor […] 
constitutes discrimination since [this factor is] beyond the control of the individual 
concerned’ (EP 2004, p.26). Lifestyle factors (‘e.g. smoking, alcohol consumption, 
stress factors, health awareness’) are ‘more objective criteria’ and should be used 
instead.  
From the perspective of the social policy goal which had motivated the proposal, 
these arguments missed the point, which was to change insurance industry practices 
in ways which would protect the pensions of a group at high risk of having 





inadequate provision, specifically women. Allowing discrimination on the basis of 
lifestyle factors would not achieve this, as women are more likely to have the lifestyle 
markers for a long life. A social policy approach would be to put everyone in the 
same risk pool, as social insurance does. But the fundamental right at issue was 
effective only in addressing the gender ground, not other drivers of inequality. 
While much of the Commission’s rationale for the Directive was framed in terms of 
social policy and rights, it was also concerned to establish that its position was 
consistent with economically-rational regulation. Thus it attempted to challenge the 
technical basis for the use of sex factors. It argued that ‘[s]tudies show that sex is not 
the main determining factor for life expectancy. Other factors have been shown to be 
more relevant, such as marital status, socio-economic factors, employment/ 
unemployment, regional area, smoking and nutrition habits’ (CEC 2003, p.6). The 
Commission acknowledged that sex might be a ‘proxy for other indicators of life 
expectancy’ and that sex was a relatively easy-to-use factor in risk classification, but 
it argued that this was an inadequate normative justification for a discriminatory 
practice. It also suggested that sex discrimination was old-fashioned, claiming that 
‘progressive insurance companies are in the process of developing new and more 
accurate means of predicting risk. As they do so, and as a consequence of 
competition, they will be able to reduce the importance of sex in their calculations 
and base their prices on sex-neutral criteria’ (CEC 2003, pp.6-7). While the 
Commission’s claim that sex may not be the most efficient predictor of longevity 
finds some support in the technical literature, as discussed further below, it was not 
able to win this argument against the determined resistance of the industry. 
The Commission might have been on firmer ground if it had been able to claim that 
standardisation of risk classification practices was necessary to ensure fair 
competition in the internal market in insurance. This was the position taken by 
France (which had a unisex rule for some annuities), which argued that different risk 
classification practices across member states could give rise to distortions of 
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competition.7 However, the Gender Goods and Services Directive was the wrong 
frame for this argument, which would need to be developed across the spectrum of 
risk classification practices, not just with reference to sex. 
Finally, the Gender Directive appeared to provide an opportunity to remedy long-
standing anomalies in the law on equal pay. The ECJ had determined that ‘pay’ 
includes occupational pension entitlements, so employers must ensure that their 
provisions are equal for men and women. However, if the insurers of pension 
schemes are using different actuarial factors for men and women, this becomes 
technically complex and produces anomalous results. For example, if the 
occupational scheme promises specified benefits (a ‘defined benefits’ or DB scheme), 
then employers have to pay higher contributions on behalf of women than men, and 
women transferring out of a DB scheme have to receive a higher lump sum. These 
difficulties could be eliminated if insurers used unisex factors in occupational 
pensions. Some member states require this, but the EU had been unable to legislate 
to establish a general rule, as the insurers underwriting pension provision are 
outside the scope of the employment-based social policy provisions of the Treaty.  
The Gender Directive promised a solution, as it could achieve a unified approach 
across markets in goods and services and employment relationships. However, a 
number of member states resisted provisions that would effectively alter the existing 
law governing equality in employment. In their view, the Gender Directive was 
meant to extend the coverage of nondiscrimination law to goods and services, not to 
further strengthen the law on employment.8 This rather formalistic position is an 
indicator that at least some member states did not wish to address substantive policy 
problems with the Gender Directive. The Commission was forced to ‘clarify’ that the 
Directive would not affect any insurance or pension related to employment.9 
                                                        
7 France entered a reservation to this effect on the directive when it was finally agreed, noting 
that ‘the legislation applicable in relation to parity in premiums and benefits for men and women 
must be the same for all insurance companies operating in a given Member State, regardless of 
their countries of origin.’ (Statement entered in the Council Minutes, EPSCO Council 4 Oct 2004, 
13137/04 ADD 1)  
8 I am grateful to Commission officials for explaining this to me. 
9 Note from the Presidency to the Council (EPSCO) 9426/1/04, Brussels 24 May 2004, p.4 





In summary, the Commission was not able to attach the insurance provisions of the 
Gender Directive to substantive social policy purposes in the course of getting 
agreement to the Directive. Thus the claims of Scharpf (1999) and others that EU-
level social policy is blocked by the demands of unanimity are confirmed, even 
though the Directive was eventually passed. The obstacles to substantive agreement 
reflected the abiding influence of the different regulatory regimes for social and 
private insurance, with social policy concerns assigned to the competence of the 
member states. This fuelled the disinclination of many member states to adopt a 
substantive measure at the European level.  
 
4. After the Directive: The regulatory settlement 
In 2004, the Gender Directive was agreed on the basis of a compromise suggested by 
the Presidency, to the effect that the use of sex-based actuarial factors could be 
allowed indefinitely, provided it was based on objective statistics. Article 16 
envisaged that the Commission would review evidence from the member states on 
the operation of this derogation from nondiscrimination and submit a report to the 
Parliament and Council. In an annex to the Council conclusions10, the Commission 
indicated that it would establish a working group to carry out this review, with 
representatives from member state governments, the insurance industry, consumers 
and equal treatment bodies. It subsequently acted on this by convening a Forum on 
the Implementation of Article 5 of the Gender Directive.11 This section first examines 
the work of the Forum, and shows how a compromise position on risk classification 
was reached and taken up by the Commission. This position was consistent with the 
promotion of further market integration, and with the insurance industry’s 
exemption from competition rules (the BER), which allowed the sharing of data to 
facilitate risk classification. Thus the regulatory policy community arrived at a 
                                                        
10 Minutes of the 2606th meeting of the Council (ESPCO), 27 October 2004, 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st13/st13369.en04.pdf. 
11 The Forum is hosted by Equinet, the European Network of Equality Bodies. Documents from 
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solution to the problem of managing the impact of nondiscrimination rights on 
insurance. This was not a static settlement - questions were raised about some 
industry practices – but insurers’ autonomy in risk classification was otherwise 
preserved. 
The Commission prepared for the first Forum meeting in September 2009 with a 
questionnaire. It asked for respondents’ views on whether sex was really a 
‘determining factor’ in risk assessment, whether published data were accurate, 
relevant and reliable, and whether published data were ‘enabl[ing] consumers to 
understand the relevance of sex to assessments of their premiums’. These questions 
suggest that the Commission had accepted the justifiability of sex differentials, but 
sought to ensure that insurers’ practices were transparent and accountable to 
consumer advocates. Not everyone accepted this way of looking at the issues: a 
response jointly prepared by AGE (the European network for older people), the 
European Women’s Lobby (EWL), and the Belgian consumer organization Test-
Achats criticized the assumptions behind the questionnaire and argued that 
‘insurance companies should .. not be allowed .. to use technical argumentation 
about actuarial issues to dismiss their legal obligations in regard to human rights’ 
(AGE et al. 2009, p.3). 
One might imagine that the discussion between the insurers and the identity group 
representatives such as AGE and EWL would be a dialogue of the deaf: one side 
seeking ways of continuing to conduct business as usual, the other seeking radical 
reform. In practice, the lines between the two groups were not so clearly drawn. 
While insurers insisted on the importance of statistically robust risk classification, 
they already had a well-established track record of avoiding contentious approaches 
to classification. Their acceptance of restrictions on the use of genetic data provided a 
recent illustration; similarly the industry offered no protest at the inclusion of 
insurance in the Race Directive. Insurers have also got used to being unable to 
discriminate between the different EU nationalities, for example by levying higher 
motor insurance premiums on foreign drivers. In other words, the apparent 
principled conflict between risk-rating and nondiscrimination was in practice a 





matter of finding boundaries between the acceptable and unacceptable use of 
personal information. Advocates of unisex tariffs argued that sex should be treated 
in the same way as race and ethnicity. Opponents drew the line differently, 
proposing that sex was a relevant factor in the same way as age or disability. For the 
industry, it was important to stick with this line, as data on the sex of applicants is 
one of the most consistently available and reliable pieces of information insurers 
have. By contrast, prohibitions on ethnic and religious classifications did not 
challenge established actuarial practices.12  
The Commission favoured drawing the line in a way that accepted existing practices 
in the insurance industry, subject to the requirement that they should be supported 
by published data. It refined this approach in its subsequent proposal for a Directive 
covering age and disability (as well as religion and sexual orientation), introduced in 
2008. Outlining the rationale for this proposal, the Commission argued that ‘[t]he use 
of age or disability by insurers and banks to assess the risk profile of customers does 
not necessarily represent discrimination: it depends on the product.’13 For these 
groups, the Commission developed a line of argument about how a more 
competitive insurance market in Europe could see some groups getting better 
coverage: for example, long-established age limits on travel insurance could be 
removed by new competitors which provided ‘niche’ products. On this perspective, 
abolition of risk factors was not the remedy for countering exclusion from insurance: 
rather, better consumer information that allowed people to find competitive 
premiums that were fair and proportionate was required. This argument was 
extensively developed in a report on the use by the financial services industry of all 
the ‘discrimination grounds’ listed in Article 13 (now 19) produced for the 
Commission (Civic Consulting 2010).   
With widespread, but not unanimous, agreement on this approach, the focus of 
discussion shifted to the publication requirements. Consumer organizations argued 
                                                        
12 Insurers have, however, been accused of indirect discrimination among ethnic groups, through 
postcode rating or through their marketing strategies.  
13 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
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for improved access to data and more transparency about industry practices. 
Insurers proposed that the industry should not be required to publish data which 
showed exactly how a premium had been arrived at, as this would limit competition. 
Of course competition was already limited by the block exemption regulation (BER) 
governing several insurance industry practices, including the sharing of data used to 
calculate risks. The BER was due for renewal in 2010, and the industry mobilized 
strongly to defend it, particularly in its application to joint calculations, tables and 
studies. The main European insurance association (the Comité Européen des 
Assurances, CEA) argued that the exemption would be ‘needed’ in the context of 
Article 5(2) because ‘[c]ooperation in this field would help to ensure the reliability 
and accuracy of the actuarial and statistical data on which the calculations are based.’ 
This position was endorsed by the Pan-European Insurance Forum (PEIF), a group of 
CEOs of major insurance companies. They argued that failure to renew the BER 
would present ‘an additional barrier to public-interest sharing of data, for instance 
around the Gender Directive..’. The Austrian Insurance Association (VVO) noted 
that, as a consequence of its data pooling functions, it already published the 
information required by the Gender Directive on its website.14   
This campaign was successful: the data-sharing part of the BER was retained, 
although other parts were ended. Consumer organisations won a small victory: the 
renewed BER required that consumer organisations, although not individuals, 
should have access to the data. In other words, insurers could be called to account by 
organised interests, which could therefore monitor the overall working of the 
market. Insurers would have to explain their practices, but would not have to deal 
with enquiries from individual consumers.  
Consumer organisations were not, in any case, necessarily inclined to engage with 
insurance rating issues. In some countries, such as Germany and Austria, consumer 
organisations had long been represented in regulatory processes and accepted the 
technical explanation of rating practices. Other problems, such as refusals to insure 
                                                        
14 The responses to the consultation can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2008_insurance_ber/index.html 





or terminations of policies, produced more complaints and provided a readier basis 
for engagement. Similarly, equality bodies, while showing a sporadic interest in 
insurance issues (for example, indirect race discrimination arising from postcode 
rating), have not been very active in taking the rights agenda forward in this area, 
presumably because they feel that the technical basis for risk rating is well 
established. 
One consequence is that the number of complaints about discrimination reaching 
courts and insurance ombudsmen has been small. Furthermore, there are more 
complaints about age and disability discrimination than about sex (Civic Consulting 
2010, p.17). Courts have tended to apply a ‘proportionality test’ in response to 
complaints of discrimination, asking whether the premium loading is proportionate 
to the increased expected cost faced by the insurer. The Civic Consulting report 
suggested that the wording in the Gender Directive, which allows ‘proportionate 
differences’ in premiums and benefits, was consistent with prevailing legal 
interpretations. However, not all insurance associations were so confident. The UK 
industry operated in compliance with the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, which 
included a loosely-phrased exemption for insurance, allowing insurers to 
discriminate on gender grounds, provided it was with reference to ‘actuarial or other 
data from a source on which it was reasonable to rely’ and the treatment was 
reasonable ‘having regard to that data and any other relevant factors’. UK insurers 
took the view that the Directive significantly tightened this exemption. The ABI 
argued that the Directive created a ‘lack of legal certainty where a company’s 
premium rates could be challenged at any time for not being close enough to 
published data tables’ (ABI 2009, p.11). 
The British position gives us some insight into the potentially destabilising effects of 
regulatory integration. UK regulatory and judicial institutions accepted prevailing 
rating practices, but the ABI feared that the application of European criteria could 
destabilise that acceptance. The Commission believed it had established a basic 
regulatory consensus across Europe about the parameters of acceptable 
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discrimination; the ABI pointed to different norms and practices established in 
different member states.  
Why were UK insurers particularly concerned? One explanation is that the UK 
market is more competitive in its institutions and practices than other European 
markets. One indicator is that the ABI does not collect and publish as much industry 
data as some of its counterparts. For example, the ABI used to collect motor 
insurance claims data from its members which it aggregated and circulated, broken 
down by major risk classes, including sex.  In the mid-1990s, this practice ceased. 
‘[S]everal of the larger insurers declined to participate as they felt they gained little 
additional insight from the aggregated data and indeed that their competitors were 
benefiting. As more insurers dropped out, the aggregated data became increasingly 
unrepresentative and the scheme was wound up.’ (UK response, Peraita 2007). If 
insurers rely on rate tables which are produced by a government-sponsored agency 
or association, and these tables identify relevant characteristics for discriminating 
between insureds, then sellers can be confident that these bases for discrimination 
are authoritatively established as acceptable. But if insurers generate data 
themselves, and innovate in the selection of characteristics for discrimination in 
order to gain a competitive advantage, then there is no authoritative interpretation of 
what constitutes an appropriate use of a characteristic to determine a difference in 
premium. 
A key factor in cultivating a regulatory consensus was that insurance industry risk 
rating practices were well-entrenched: even, one might say, ‘embedded’ in social 
norms and expectations. However, market integration undermined the taken-for-
grantedness of these norms, because practices varied across countries for no obvious 
reason. To take the example of motor insurance, a number of states require unisex 
rating. There is no apparent pattern to this. Some central European states, along with 
Cyprus, did not utilise the derogation in Article 5(2) of the Gender Directive, perhaps 
because of a lack of adequate data or an inclination to adopt European directives in 
full. In the Netherlands and Belgium, the case against sex differentiation in 
mandatory insurance was comprehensively aired. Academic commentators 





contributed to the debate (Thiery and Van Schoubroeck 2006). In Belgium, Test-
Achats adopted the position that rating should reflect the individual’s driving 
record, not his or her immutable characteristics.15 
The community of expertise in insurance has generally upheld the use of sex factors 
in risk rating. However, there are some opposing voices, and statistical studies have 
not always endorsed insurers’ practices. For example, Rothgang et al (2005) 
examined sex differentials in health insurance premiums in Germany and argued 
that they were inadequately justified by the available statistics. More generally, large 
errors have affected actuarial projections of longevity in recent years, and some 
commentators have argued that failure to take sufficient note of lifestyle changes has 
contributed to these errors. One inference that might be drawn is that projections 
have relied too heavily on standard assumptions about male and female lifestyle 
patterns, and direct use of lifestyle indicators could produce better forecasts (Hudson 
2007). This view has been endorsed by the head of pensions strategy at the major UK 
insurer, Legal and General. Adrian Boulding has argued in favour of unisex rating, 
even in life insurance and annuities.16 His position is particularly striking as he is a 
member of the ABI’s pensions committee, although he has not been able to shift the 
majority view in the ABI, which is trenchantly opposed. 
In summary, the regulatory policy community was not unanimous in its view of sex 
discrimination in insurance. However, the regulatory debate adopted some common 
parameters. Insurers’ sensitivity to social norms and EU imperatives was evident in 
their acceptance of prohibitions on race and nationality discrimination. Boundaries in 
the acceptable use of information were acknowledged, and staying inside the 
boundaries was a way to make sure that insurers enjoyed autonomy in setting 
premium levels and differentials. Particular markets were subject to controls for 
social policy reasons, but established practices were both necessary to combat 
adverse selection and defensible as reflecting statistical differences in risk. There was 
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scope for innovations in technical analysis and these could conceivably lead to 
amendments in the use of sex factors, but any such amendments would have to be 
based on a careful assessment of the effects on risk selection. Furthermore, premiums 
had to be based on the best statistical estimates of loss, as cross-subsidies between 
risk groups would not be sustainable in a competitive market.  
 
5. The ECJ overturns the regulatory settlement 
In March 2011, the ECJ’s Grand Chamber ruled in Test-Achats17 that the ongoing 
practice of sex discrimination in insurance was a derogation from the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women that could not be permitted indefinitely. It 
ruled that Article 5(2) would cease to be valid from December 2012, effectively 
restoring the Commission’s original draft of the Directive which envisaged a move to 
equality with an extended transition phase. This section examines the Advocate-
General’s opinion in Test-Achats, along with the very terse judgment (it is succinct 
even by the standards of the ECJ). It also looks at the Court’s approach in Lindorfer,18 
a case involving a Commission employee in which various obiter dicta were 
forthcoming that were significant for Test-Achats. The central question is this: why 
did the ECJ not follow the regulatory approach outlined in the previous section? 
National courts had not overturned industry practices, being willing to accept 
technical arguments about the proportionality of the industry’s approach. Why did 
the ECJ see the issues differently? 
We begin with Advocate-General Jacobs’ opinion in Lindorfer. Ms Lindorfer had 
challenged the terms on which her pension rights were transferred to the 
Community employees’ pension scheme, on grounds of sex, age and nationality 
discrimination. Only the sex discrimination complaint was upheld, where the 
complaint concerned the use of different actuarial values for men and women in 
                                                        
17 Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil 
des ministres, Judgment of 1 March 2011. 
18 Case C-227/04P, Maria-Luise Lindorfer v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 11 Sept 
2007. 





calculating the years of service to be credited when Ms Lindorfer took up 
employment in the Commission. AG Jacobs produced several different reasons for 
upholding the complaint. First, he questioned the claim that different actuarial 
values were necessary for sound financial management, pointing out that using 
average values for men and women would leave the income and expenditure of the 
scheme unchanged (para 49). Second, he drew attention to the inconsistency between 
the scheme applying to transfer rights and the scheme covering established 
employees, where men and women paid equal contributions despite their different 
expected stream of benefits. He added a definite view on how equality of benefits 
should be understood: what mattered was that each employee received a pension for 
life of a certain ‘weekly, monthly or yearly amount… The total paid out by the time 
of the recipient’s death is completely irrelevant..’ (para 68). Thus he applied the 
methodology of equal pay to the assessment of pension benefits. 
Third, Jacobs reflected more generally on the potential to justify the unequal 
treatment at issue. He pointed out that the use of different actuarial factors was an 
example of direct discrimination, and suggested that the law only allowed for 
justifications to be brought to bear on indirect discrimination. Citing the US Supreme 
Court, he questioned whether the different treatment of women as a class was 
permissable, as it involved ‘ascribing to individuals average characteristics of a class 
to which they belong’ (para 59). It would clearly be unacceptable to ascribe 
characteristics on the basis of ethnicity, and ‘I cannot see that the use of sex rather 
than ethnic origin can be any more acceptable’ (para 60).  
The previous section discussed how the Forum on Article 5(2) addressed this 
question. In effect, its answer was that the use of sex was more acceptable because it 
was well-established and embedded in industry practices, including the collection of 
relevant statistics. For Jacobs, the normality of sex classifications was not persuasive, 
as the question at issue concerned the fundamental right of equal treatment in 
employment, which is not an entrenched norm but an ongoing project. 
The Lindorfer case was not decided by the Court after Jacobs’ opinion was brought 
down, because another Court decision on age discrimination apparently reopened 
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some of the issues, and a new hearing was convened. Jacobs’ successor as the UK 
Advocate General, Sharpston, produced another opinion.  She endorsed Jacobs’ 
approach, in particular arguing that the Court should be prepared to apply the 
general principle of equal treatment without being dependent on its precise 
expression in directives. This position was adopted in the final judgment, with the 
formulation that relevant passages in directives and regulations ‘are specific 
expressions of the general principle of equality’ (para 50), an approach which left the 
Court with wide scope for interpretative manoeuvre. 
Not that the Court really used this scope to deviate far from regulatory norms in its 
decision in Lindorfer. The Court endorsed Jacobs’ view of the inconsistency in the 
Commission’s practices, which arguably arose from the incomplete coverage of 
relevant directives and regulations. The ability to cut through this inconsistency by 
invoking a general principle was useful to the Court. However, it also relied on a less 
legalistic argument. Sharpston had noted that the Commission had introduced 
unisex actuarial tables in 2004, thereby tacitly confirming Jacobs’ claim that different 
factors were not necessary to the sound financial operation of the scheme. The 
judgment also placed importance on this fact (para 58). Thus we can see the Court 
reading back from changes in employer practices to justify the development of legal 
principles, an example of the two-way communication that Dobbin and Sutton (1998) 
emphasised.  
The Court’s formulation and interpretation of the general principle of equal 
treatment was central to the case brought by Test-Achats. It argued that Article 5(2) 
was invalid because it contravened this general principle. Arrayed against it in the 
Court were the Commission and the Council, and the Irish, French, Lithuanian, 
Finnish and UK governments, along with the Belgian respondents. The very 
structure of this David-and-Goliath case indicates how judicial and regulatory 
processes differ, both in procedure and content. A consensual and negotiated process 
with these participants could never reach the view arrived at by the Court. Nor 
would a regulator be in a position to test the instructions of the legislature against 
wide constitutional principles. 





Advocate-General Kokott’s opinion provides a number of further examples of how a 
judicial and a regulatory logic can differ. Unlike the opinions reviewed above, Kokott 
did go into the question of whether the statistical association between sex and life 
expectancy or driving proficiency can justify discrimination. For her, relevant issues 
are that a person has no influence over their gender (para 50), and that the provision 
at issue ‘does not focus on any clear biological differences’, but instead is concerned 
with a statistical association (para 52). The Council, Kokott argued, ‘does not do 
justice to the complexity of the problem’ by setting up a procedure which relies on 
statistical verification (para 65). The practical grounds for using sex as an indicator 
rather than relevant social factors are dismissed: sex should not be used ‘for reasons 
of convenience’ (para 66). It is also striking that Kokott is uninterested in whether 
unisex tariffs will benefit or disadvantage women: she notes that some tariffs will go 
up but there will be lower premiums for ‘the other sex’ (para 68). There is no 
instrumental reasoning in the opinion: the principle of equal treatment should be 
followed unless there was a serious danger to the financial equilibrium of private 
insurance. 
However, there are other arguments in the judgment which do strike a chord with 
the regulatory debate. In particular, Kokott argued that social changes have changed 
the relationship between life expectancy and sex, which would seem to imply that 
there was scope for an empirical resolution of this issue. However, Kokott’s point in 
drawing attention to these social changes was not to enter an empirical discussion 
but to link equal treatment to an evolving and progressive project, setting up a 
rationale for changing the rules governing insurers now but not earlier. 
Kokott also drew attention to the way in which the regulatory settlement tolerated 
different practices across the member states. The derogation from equality in Article 
5(2) could only be used ‘where national legislation has not already applied the unisex 
rule’ (Recital 19 of the Directive). The effect is ‘that in some Member States it is 
possible for men and women to be treated differently with regard to an insurance 
product whereas in other Member States they must be treated in the same way with 
regard to the same insurance product’ (para 23). This could not be an expression of 
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equal treatment. We can also note that it posed a difficulty for the operation of a 
single insurance market in Europe, with the question of whether a discriminating 
insurer could enter a nondiscriminating market remaining, at that stage, unresolved. 
Finally, we can note that Kokott, and Jacobs, invoked the caselaw of the US Supreme 
Court which has upheld unisex tariffs in occupational pensions.  We can interpret the 
US references as an attempt on the part of the Advocates General to strengthen their 
authority by invoking supranational legal norms. Equally, this instance of the 
globalisation of law could be seen as following a regulatory logic: EU insurers, the 
inference is, will not be disadvantaged in competitive markets by adhering to a 
constitutive basis also found elsewhere. 
In summary, we can find both institutional and ideational reasons why the ECJ did 
not uphold the regulatory consensus. It was apparently uninfluenced by the strength 
of industry opinion weighed against it. Instead it relied on the idea that common 
norms should govern the operation of the single market, which effectively gave great 
weight to those states that had adopted the unisex principle. The Court insisted on 
consistency in other ways too. It extended the unisex principle by analogy from 
employment into other areas, instead of allowing each regulatory domain to arrive at 
its own set of rules. The analysis was principled rather than instrumental and 
practical. Factors that had been important in the regulatory discussion, notably the 
accuracy of the statistical foundation for discrimination and the requirements for 
publication of data, received very little attention. Finally, the Court asserted higher 
constitutional authority over delegated regulatory authority. It held that it is not 
open to the Commission and the Council to substantially and indefinitely derogate 
from the constitutional principle of equal treatment. Thus it invoked a higher order 










This paper has asked whether we are seeing a rights revolution in Europe, 
specifically through the widening application of the principle of nondiscrimination. 
The answer turns out to depend on what we think the distinctive characteristics of a 
rights revolution are. For Kelemen, ‘rights’ refer generally to the bases for legal 
claims, rather than specifically to fundamental rights. He does not succumb to the 
rhetoric of ‘revolution’ but draws attention to the pervasive legalism engendered by 
the federal structure of governance in Europe. For Dobbin and Sutton, the particular 
nature of nondiscrimination and other general rights statements is significant, 
because their generality and ambiguity creates uncertainty which produces 
anticipatory innovations in corporate practices and a dialogue between corporate 
best practice and judicial interpretation. This paper has argued that fundamental 
rights are distinct from other kinds of legal claims because the ECJ has established 
considerable autonomy in interpreting and applying fundamental rights.  
Anticipatory adjustment in regulatory or self-regulatory venues is not completely 
absent from the story related here. There was some introspection about risk 
classification practices among the regulatory policy community, and analysis did 
reveal some anomalies. Some industry actors urged progressive adaptation to new 
norms. On the whole, however, the industry was confident of its technical expertise 
and willing to exercise its power in regulatory venues to prevent adjustment. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s endeavours to reduce legal uncertainty were 
conservative: it did not promote changes in industry approaches. It might have been 
thought in the Commission that convening a forum and providing access to 
information to consumer organisations could set in motion a reform dialogue. There 
was little sign of this, but then not much time elapsed before the Court intervened. 
The gap between the approaches of the Court and the Commission that emerges in 
the case of insurance challenges the ‘Eurolegalism’ analysis which sees the two 
institutions acting in concert to empower the federal level of regulation in Europe 
relative to the member states. It suggests instead that the involvement of the ECJ in 
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the interpretation of fundamental rights introduces a legal logic of interpretation 
which is distinct from a regulatory logic. Specifically, the Court has applied equality 
between men and women as a fundamental principle in constituting relationships 
between buyers and sellers in the European market, but it has not been concerned 
with instrumentalizing this principle for social policy purposes. Once satisfied that 
discrimination was not necessary to ensure the financial soundness of insurance, it 
undertook no further economic analysis. Whereas the regulatory process attached 
primary importance to statistical evidence, the Court questioned the use of statistical 
generalisations. Procedural aspects of the regulatory compromise - specifically the 
creation of a forum in which different views could be aired and issues raised – did 
not interest the Court; nor did it pay much attention to the weight of expert economic 
opinion.  
The result was evidence of a ‘rights revolution’ in the specific sense that the existence 
of a fundamental right was invoked to overrule long-established practices and to 
sweep away the regulatory consensus that had supported them. However, amidst 
the drama of this process, it is important to recognise the limitations of what has 
been done. The rhetoric of a rights revolution is linked to an idea that the economic 
interests promoted by the classic rights of property and contract might be countered 
by the recognition of social rights that empower groups that are economically or 
politically excluded. The rights revolution in this context means empowering 
households against ‘big business’: specifically for Europe, it means a a social 
dimension of European integration achieved by enabling households to exercise 
rights as a corrective and counterweight to the influence of industry. It was noted in 
the introduction that many instances have arisen in Europe where nondiscrimination 
rights have been used to challenge monopolies or to break open domestic markets, 
but these situations generally arise when nondiscrimination rights are bracketed 
with competitive market freedoms. Thus the case of insurance was a critical case for 
examining the ‘free standing’ power of nondiscrimination rights which are not 
aligned with market openness and liberalisation. 
 





At first sight, the ECJ has passed the test of establishing autonomous social rights. On 
a closer look, however, its achievement is rather limited. It has made it clear that 
insurers may discriminate between insureds on other grounds than sex. If insurers 
can find the ‘lifestyle’ correlates of women’s longer life expectancy in their 
occupations, family histories and other indicators, then the effect on annuity rates for 
many women will not be dramatic. More generally, the Court has not been 
concerned to promote ‘solidarity’: in other words, to encourage the formation of 
larger, less differentiated risk pools that emulate those provided by social insurance. 
This rights revolution has not been a social policy revolution. 
It is well-established that there are tensions in Europe between processes of market 
integration and processes that maintain welfare states. The rights revolution brings 
in a third process. This paper has suggested that this process need not merely be the 
handmaiden of market integration, but nor is it a process that contributes 
instrumentally to social policy. While equality rights can be pursued by regulatory 
means, regulatory processes are dominated by industry interests. The development 
of more rights for households as consumers and workers is likely to be a highly 
judicialized process, and this will shape the development of equality rights in 
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